Compatibilism

We were raised in a culture that teaches us or encourage us to believe that we have free will and are responsible for our actions.  On the other hand there is the belief that humans are not responsible for their actions: that there are forces over which we have no control and that our actions are causal.  Which means that there are antecedent causes that explains behaviour such as the laws of nature e.g. gravity, and also conditioning.  If we were to consider some basic human behaviour like response to stimuli we might argue that humans are determined, but then there are voluntary actions which are as a result of our desires and emotions, which would make it seem like we are free.

This problem of free will and determinism has attracted many great minds that have put forth some very attractive arguments in support of their beliefs.  The different positions on this issue are: Libertarianism – which is the theory that humans are entirely free and are first cause for all their actions.  Determinism – there is Hard Determinism with the belief that all actions are caused and then there is Soft Determinism or Compatibilism – a third position that tries to combine the best of the other two positions, which says that although everything is determined we can still act voluntarily (Pojman 324).  I will to the best of my ability present conclusive arguments and counter arguments for each of these positions and then give my support and defend the one I consider to be the most reasonable – Compatibilism.

            Determinism is the theory that everything in the universe is governed by causal laws; that is, everything in the universe is entirely determined so that whatever happens at any given moment is the effect of some antecedent cause (Pojman 327).  This position of causation as the explanation for all actions is termed Hard Determinism.  It contends that there are no other explanations for human actions except that it is as a result of antecedent causes.  Although, our ability to deliberate – argument for Libertarian – seems obvious that we are free, the determinist argues that we often feel free, but these feelings are illusory and that the deliberation is the product of antecedent cause.

            In addition the Determinist states that humans have been conditioned by deliberate and accidental patterns of stimulus response reinforcements.  For example kids learn what hugs and kisses would get them the gift they want.  Parents, on the other hand learn what rewards and punishments will get the children to do what the parents want (website).  Determinists believe that everyone has a price.  Money is one big conditioning agent.  For example if the price is ‘right’ you can get someone to do what you want him or her to do.  As per Prof. Peccorino he can get a student to leave the classroom and not return if he make them an offer they cannot refuse.  It was proven for he offered a student a 100% grade on all the past papers if she would leave the classroom.  At first she was reluctant and thought he is crazy and was unsure whether to believe him or not until he was about to pass the offer to someone else.  This illustrates the ability to predict behaviour if you know how to push someone’s button.  Determinists believe that if you know how to “push” someone’s buttons you can get them to do what you want.  In other words through conditioning there are basic human behaviours that can be predicted and per the determinists believe when they have greater knowledge of the laws of human behaviour they will be able to predict what a human will do under any set of circumstances and manipulate a human into any behaviour (website).

            According to Pojman, there have been no greater defenders of the views that humans are free than the existentialist.  They believe in radical freedom.  The existentialist argues that existence precedes essence; there is no essence to a human being that preexists the human and makes that human what the human is.  For the existentialist no matter what humans do they must choose.  Even if they decide not to choose they have chosen.  Determinists on the other hand states that if human action is the result of the impulse he receives, and when he does not act according to this impulse it is because there comes some new cause, some new motive (Pojman 326).  This difference in behaviour is as a result of stronger stimuli that annihilate the first.

            Libertarians’ arguments appeal to the introspective experience of deliberation or deep intuition of spontaneous actions or our sense of moral responsibility (Pojman 332).  In other words our ability to deliberate and feel regret or remorse is proof that we are free. 

            “There is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that

            he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading

            to those choices are also free flowing.  The normal man feels too, after

            he has made a decision, that he could have decided differently.  That is

            why regret or remorse for a past choice can be so disturbing.” (Pojman 332)

 

For the existentialist deliberation may take a short or long time, be foolish or wise, but the process is a conscious one wherein we believe that we are really can do either of the actions.  That is, in deliberating, we assume that we are free to choose between alternatives and that we are not determined to do simply one action.

            Determinists argues that while deliberating the sense of freedom may prevail, at least on one level but on a higher level or after the deliberation process is over, it is acknowledged that even the deliberation is the product of antecedent causes.  Ledger Wood suggests that the Libertarian argument from deliberation can be reduced to this formula: “I feel free, therefore, I am free” and he accounts for this feeling as “nothing but a sense of relief following upon earlier tension and indecision” (Pojman 333).

            Libertarian also posits the argument from moral responsibility, which states that if causal antecedents determine us we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions.  Where determinism entails that we couldn’t have done otherwise moral responsibility entails that we could have done otherwise.  It is hard to understand how society would survive, without a deep sense of moral responsibility.  Humans have duties and cannot be completely determined, and if determinism is true, we cannot be held responsible for our actions and there would be no order and besides criminals would roam the streets.  Libertarian denies the premise that if our choices are not determined, then some of our choices are not under our control.  Also, they contend that human choices are neither determined nor random.  They are first causes.

            Causal determinism seems to account for all the events in the world.  Morality seems to require that we choose differently and thus may be held accountable for our actions.  Compatibilism tries to combine the best of the two position i.e. determinism and Libertarianism, which says that although everything is determined we can still act voluntarily (Pojman 324).  It argues that although we are determined we still have moral responsibilities.  Their basis for distinction is between voluntary and involuntary behaviour.  The compatibilist argues that the fact that we are determined does not affect our interpersonal relation (Pojman 343).  There are feelings we must deal with that require internal insights.  For example if someone hurts us “on purpose” we still feel resentment.  Likewise, we feel grateful for services rendered.  However, from the external perspective of the determinist all of this is valid.  Stace argues that the voluntary acts of freedom and the causal processes of determinism that underlie all behaviour and events need not be incompatible.  Gandhi fasted because he wanted to free India – an example of a voluntary or free act – whereas a man in the desert fasted involuntarily, an unfree act.  Likewise, a thief purposefully and voluntarily steals, whereas a kleptomaniac cannot help stealing.  Both cases have antecedent causes, but where the former in both cases are free acts the latter are un-free.  The Compatibilist joins with the determinist and asserts that all actions can be causally explained.  Where free act are caused by reasons the person has, unfree actions are caused by nonrational coercion.  A conclusion to the argument for compatibilism is “acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent.  Acts not freely done are those whose immediate cause are states of affairs external to the agent” (Pojman 347).

            We have examined the three main theories regarding free will and determinism – determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism, and have found each to have virtues and vices.  Determinism seems to conflict with the thesis that we have moral responsibilities, for responsibility implies that we could have done otherwise than we did.  For example, we cannot hold a baby responsible for crying, but we do hold a twenty-year old student responsible for cheating because (we believe) he could have done otherwise (Pojman 350).   The problem with the Libertarian’s argument from introspection is that our introspections and intuitions about our behaviour are often misguided.  To illustrate this an experiment performed by Dr. Frederickson where patients with electrodes attached to their neocortex are set before a button that sets off a bell. They were told that they might press the button at anytime.  The process was proclaimed by the patients to be entirely free.  However, the monitoring of the brain shows that an impulse is started in the cerebral cortex before the awareness of the desire and decision to press the button (Pojman 338).  It seems, them that the introspective reports must be regarded as providing very little evidence in favor of free will in the libertarian sense.  So we see that neither of the two can account reasonably for human behaviour.  Our only resolute is compatibilism, which states that although everything is determined we can still act voluntarily.  If we look at ourselves through the eyes of science and neuro-physiology, we will no doubt regard ourselves as determined.  If we look at ourselves from a moral perspective and subjective deliberators, we must view ourselves as having free will.  We stand in wonder at the dualism that forces us to take both an objective/determinist and a subjective/libertarian perspective of conscious behaviour.  Which leaves us with no choice but to accept the compatibilist theory.  This dichotomy seems unsatisfactory, incompatible, and yet inescapable.