Flew's Response to Hare
From "Symposium on Theology and Falsification,"
Antony Flew, R. M. Hare and Basil Mitchell.
The challenge, it will be remembered, ran like this. Some
theological utterances seem to, and are intended to, provide
explanations or express assertions. Now an assertion, to be an
assertion at all, must claim that things stand thus and thus; and
not otherwise. Similarly an explanation, to be an explanation at
all, must explain why this particular thing occurs; and not
something else. Those last clauses are crucial. And yet
sophisticated religious people - or so it seemed to me - are apt to
overlook this, and tend to refuse to allow, not merely that anything
actually does occur, but that anything conceivably could occur,
which would count against their theological assertions and
explanations. But in so far as they do this their supposed
explanations are actually bogus, and their seeming assertions are
really vacuous.
Hare's approach is fresh and bold. He confesses that 'on the
ground marked out by Flew, he seems to me to be completely
victorious'. He therefore introduces the concept of blik. But while
I think that there is room for some such concept in philosophy, and
that philosophers should be grateful to Hare for his invention, I
nevertheless want to insist that any attempt to analyse Christian
religious utterances as expressions or affirmations of a blik rather
than as (at least would-be) assertions about the cosmos is
fundamentally misguided. First, because thus interpreted they would
be entirely unorthodox. If Hare's religion really is a blik,
involving no cosmological assertions about the nature and activities
of a supposed personal creator, then surely he is not a Christian
at, all? Second, because thus interpreted, they could scarcely do
the job they do. If they were not even intended as assertions, then
many religious activities would become fraudulent, or merely silly.
If 'You ought because it is God's will'*asserts no more than 'You
ought', then the person who prefers the former phraseology is not
really giving a reason, but a fraudulent substitute for one, a
dialectical dud checque. If 'My soul must be immortal because God
loves his children, etc.' asserts no more than 'My soul must be
immortal', then the man who reassures himself with theological
arguments for immortality is being as silly as the man who tries to
clear his overdraft by writing his bank a checque on the same
account. (Of course neither of these utterances would be
distinctively Christian: but this discussion never pretended to be
so confined.) Religious utterances may indeed express false or even
bogus assertions: but I simply do not believe that they are not both
intended and interpreted to be or at any rate to presuppose
assertions, at least in the context of religious practice; whatever
shifts may be demanded, in another context, by the exigencies of
theological apologetic.
One final suggestion. The philosophers of religion might well
draw upon George Orwell's last appalling nightmare 1984
for the concept of doublethink.
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory
beliefs simultaneously, and accepting both of them. The party
intellectual knows that he is playing tricks with reality, but by
the exercise of doublethink he also satisfied himself that reality
is not violated' (1984, p. 220).
Perhaps religious intellectuals too are sometimes driven to
doublethink in order to retain their faith in a loving God in face
of the reality of a heartless and indifferent world. But of this
more another time, perhaps.