By the mere light of
reason it seems difficult to prove the Immortality of the Soul; the
arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or
moral or physical. But in reality 'tis the Gospel and the
Gospel alone, that has brought life and immortality to light.
I. METAPHYSICAL topics
suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis impossible {24} for
thought to belong to a material substance.
1) But just metaphysics
teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect,
and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of
particular qualities, inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore,
and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what
qualities inhere in the one or in the other.
2) They likewise teach us
that nothing can be decided a priori concerning any cause or effect, and
that experience being the only source of our judgments of this nature, we
cannot know from any other principle, whether matter, by its structure or
arrangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot
decide any question of fact or existence. -- But admitting a spiritual
substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire
of the Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have
reason to conclude {25} from analogy that nature uses it after the manner
she does the other substance, matter. She employs it as a kind of paste or
clay; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences; dissolves after
a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the
same material substance may successively compose the bodies of all
animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds: Their
consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life,
may be continually dissolved by death. And nothing interests them in the
new modification. The most positive asserters of the mortality of the
soul, never denied the immortality of its substance. And that an
immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory or
consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be immaterial.
-- Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supposing any
new interposition of the supreme cause, which ought always to be excluded
from philosophy, {26} what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable. The
Soul therefore if immortal, existed before our birth; and if the former
existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter. -- Animals
undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, tho' in a more
imperfect manner than men; are their souls also immaterial and immortal?
II. MORAL
Let us now consider the
moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is
supposed to be farther interested in the farther punishment of the vicious
and reward of the virtuous. -- But these arguments are grounded on the
supposition that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in this
universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the
existence of these attributes? -- 'Tis very safe for us to affirm, that
whatever we know the Deity to have actually done, is best; but 'tis very
dangerous to affirm, that he must always do {27} what to us seems best. In
how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard to the present
world? -- But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the
whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by
natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern
from the original inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he
ever look farther? What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy,
betwixt so floating an idea, and the most doubtful persuasion of any
matter of fact that occurs in common life. There arise indeed in some
minds some unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity; but these would
quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and
education. And those who foster them, what is their motive? Only to gain a
livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very zeal
and industry therefore is an argument against them. {28} WHAT cruelty,
what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to confine all our concern, as
well as all our knowledge, to the present life, if there be another scene
still waiting us, of infinitely greater consequence? Ought this barbarous
deceit to be ascribed to a beneficent and wife being? -- Observe with what
exact proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are
adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him great
superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably
multiplied upon him; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity,
courage, and passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against the
miseries of his present condition, and frequently, nay almost always are
too slender for the business assigned them. -- A pair of shoes perhaps was
never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection which that commodity
is capable of attaining. Yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that
there should be some politicians and moralists, {29} even some geometers,
poets, and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more
superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of
foxes and hares are, compared to their wants and to their period of
existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious. --
O/N\ the theory of the Soul's mortality, the inferiority of women's
capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life requires no higher
faculties, either of mind or body. This circumstance vanishes and becomes
absolutely insignificant, on the religious theory: the one sex has an
equal task to perform as the other; their powers of reason and resolution
ought also to have been equal, and both of them infinitely greater than at
present. As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach
the first cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is
ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or
vengeance. -- By what rule are punishments {30} and rewards distributed?
What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? shall we suppose that
human sentiments have place in the Deity? How bold that hypothesis. We
have no conception of any other sentiments. -- According to human
sentiments, sense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, &c.
are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an
elysium for poets and heroes like that of the ancient mythology? Why
confine all rewards to one species of virtue? Punishment, without any
proper end or purpose, is inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and
justice, and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed.
Punishment, according to our conception, should bear some proportion to
the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so
frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who
intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his
favorite horse Bucephalus?[5] {31} HEAVEN\ and Hell suppose two distinct
species of men, the good and the bad; but the greatest part of mankind
float betwixt vice and virtue. -- Were one to go round the world with an
intention of giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing
to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would
find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely
amount to the value of either. -- To suppose measures of approbation and
blame different from the human confounds every thing. Whence do we learn
that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own
sentiments? -- What man who has not met with personal provocation (or what
good-natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame
alone, even the common, legal, frivolous punishments? And does any thing
steel the breast of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity
but reflection on necessity and public interest? {32} By the Roman law
those who had been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime, were put
into a sack alone with an ape, a dog, and a serpent, and thrown into the
river. Death alone was the punishment of those whose who denied their
guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried before Augustus, and
condemned after a full conviction, but the humane emperor, when he put the
last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a
denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the "prince) did not kill your
father."[6] This lenity suits our natural ideas of right even towards the
greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a
sufference. Nay even the most bigotted priest would naturally without
reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity;
for as these crimes hurt himself in his temporal interest and advantages,
perhaps he may not be altogether so {33} indulgent to them. The chief
source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of human society.
Ought these interests, so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by
punishments eternal and infinite? The damnation of one man is an
infinitely greater evil in the universe, than the subversion of a thousand
millions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail
and mortal, as it were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary
state; the half of mankind die before they are rational creatures.
III. PHYSICAL
The Physical arguments
from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul, and
are really the only philosophical arguments which ought to be admitted
with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact. -- Where any
two objects are so closely connected that all alterations which we have
ever seen in the one, are attended with proportionable alterations in the
other; we ought to conclude {34} by all rules of analogy, that, when there
are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally
dissolved, there follows a total dissolution of the latter. -- Sleep, a
very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at
least a great confusion in the soul. -- The weakness of the body and that
of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigour in manhood,
their sympathetic disorder in sickness; their common gradual decay in old
age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in
death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers are disorder, weakness,
insensibility, and stupidity, the fore-runners of its annihilation. The
farther progress of the same causes increasing, the same effects totally
extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can
continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the
original one, in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in
the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of
climate is often {35} fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense
alteration, such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body and
all its organs of thought and sensation, can be effected without the
dissolution of the whole? Every thing is in common betwixt soul and body.
The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other. The
existence therefore of the one must be dependant on that of the other. --
The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal; and these bear so near a
resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other
forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling; yet no
one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The
Metempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy
can harken to.
4) NOTHING in this
world is perpetual, every thing however seemingly firm is in continual
flux and change, the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and
dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine {36} that one
single from, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest
disorders, is immortal and indissoluble? ([editor's note] 5) What daring
theory is that! how lightly, not to say how rashly entertained! How to
dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences ought also to
embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system we are
at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we
can fix on no other supposition. For these then a new universe must every
generation be created beyond the bounds of the present universe, or one
must have been created at first so prodigiously wise as to admit of this
continual influx of beings. ([editor's note] 6) Ought such bold
suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on there
pretext of a bare possibility? When it is asked whether Agamemnon
Thersites, Hannibal, Varro, and every stupid clown that ever existed in
Italy, Scythia, Bactria or Guinea, are now alive; can any man think, that
a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments {37} strong enough to answer
so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without
revelation sufficiently establishes the negative. -- "Quanto facilius
(says Pliny[7]) "certius que sibi quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis
antigene tali sumere experimento." Our insensibility before the
composition of the body, seems to natural reason a proof of a like state
after dissolution. Were our horrors of annihilation an original passion,
not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the
mortality of the soul. For as nature does nothing in vain, she would never
give us a horror against an impossible event. She may give us a horror
against an unavoidable; yet the human species could not be preserved had
not nature inspired us with and aversion toward it. All doctrines are to
be suspected which are favored by {38} our passions, and the hopes and
fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious. 'T/IS\ an
infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the
question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this
circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or
analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and
which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust
in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of
so marvelous a scene? Some new species of logic is requisite for that
purpose, and some new faculties of the mind, that may enable us to
comprehend that logic. NOTHING could set in a fuller light the infinite
obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no
other medium could ascertain this great and important truth. {39}