| Reading:
Title: Thomson, the Right to Life, and Partial-Birth
Abortion
Author: Peter Alward
Publication Information: Journal of Medical Ethics, 28,
no.2 (April
2002), pp. 99-101
Summary:
Judith Thomson’s article “A Defense of Abortion” concludes
that
termination of a pregnancy that resulted without a woman’s
consent is
morally permissible, even if a fetus is a person with a full
right to
life. Peter Alward who initially agreed with Thomson’s
conclusion for a
long time, however, later finds a problem with her
conclusion. He
presents a series of cases and analogies to prove that
Thomson’s
argument does not “yield a ground for robust right to an
abortion”.
Alward uses an example in which Sarah needs a respirator
and a dialysis
machine as bare minimums to survive. Sarah is entitled to
have a
dialysis machine but respirator belongs to Fred. In this
analogy, Sarah
is the fetus, Fred is the pregnant woman, dialysis machine
consists of
body organs of the fetus, and respirator is the womb. If Fred
did not
consent to the use of his respirator by Sarah, as per
Thomson’s view,
Fred can take back his respirator. She says that respirator
is Fred’s
property and he has a full right to his property. Not so
fast, says
Alward. While exercising his right to the respirator, Fred
should not
violate Sarah’s right to her property, the dialysis machine.
Since right
to life outweighs right to property, only time Fred can ask
for his
property is when his life is at stake. And according to
Thomson, Fred
can use any method to retrieve his respirator in
self-defense. However,
Alward says Fred can detach the respirator off Sarah only
when, in doing
so he does not violate Sarah’s right to life. Dialysis
machine consists
of Sarah’s body organs, including her brain. Therefore, the
only
procedure Fred can use to get his respirator back in
self-defense is by
detaching Sarah from respirator while leaving her connected
to the
dialysis machine.
With the above analogy, Alward proves that Partial Birth
Abortion is
morally impermissible. In this so- called ICD procedure,
physicians
first dilate the cervix, partially remove the fetus from womb
(feet
first), insert a sharp object into the back of the fetus’s
head, then
insert a vacuum tube through the hole and suck the brain out.
This
contracts the fetus’s head and physicians can then easily
remove it.
Alward argues that mind of the fetus is something that fetus
needs to
survive and entirely belongs to it. Alward says even to save
the
pregnant woman’s life, we cannot just use any other method of
abortion.
If there is an option to save the fetus by removing it
through caesarean
section and placing in an incubator, we have to choose that
alternative.
If that results in the death of the fetus, then it is morally
permissible.
Alward then brings up two more points worth discussing in
favor of a
fetus’s right to life. First, if a pregnant woman refrains to
have an
abortion for more than five months, she may have tacitly
consented to
the fetus’s continued use of her body. Secondly, carrying a
fetus to
term may require “only minimally decent samaritanism of the
pregnant
woman”.
Alward concludes that, “if the pregnant woman’s life is
not at stake,
then, no procedure which causes the fetus’s death by any
means except
its removal from the woman’s body is morally permissible”.
It means
that Partial Birth Abortion or any similar type pf procedures
used in
late term abortion is simply not permissible. Alward poses a
serious
challenge to those who are relying on Thomson’s conclusions
for their
pro-choice stand.
Summary: Hita Gurung (QCC,2003) |