READING: No real Distinction
: The Crucial Element is Intention
http://www.cariboo.bc.ca/ae/php/phil/mclaughl/students/phil433/rachels1.htm
http://www.cariboo.bc.ca/ae/php/phil/mclaughl/students/phil433/rachels2.htm
http://www.cariboo.bc.ca/ae/php/phil/mclaughl/students/phil433/rachels3.htm
http://www.cariboo.bc.ca/ae/php/phil/mclaughl/students/phil433/rachels4.htm
Outline by Don
Berkich, University of Texas, Corpus Christi
(by permission)
Synopsis: |
Rachels is concerned to show that the AMA's
doctrine on euthanasia--that passive euthanasia is morally permissible
while active euthanasia is morally impermissible, the so-called
Conventional Doctrine on Euthanasia (CDE)--is false. It is important to
note that in showing that CDE is false Rachel's is not taking a stand on
the moral permissibility or impermissibility of either active or passive
euthanasia. Instead, his conclusion is perhaps best expressed as a
conditional:
IF passive euthanasia is morally permissible THEN active euthanasia
is morally permissible.
Rachel's first two arguments are sound if one is a Utilitarian. But
even if one were not a Utilitarian, it seems that Rachels' third
argument is inescapably sound. It follows that, indeed, the AMA's policy
on euthanasia is seriously misguided, which is just a nice way of saying
that it is blatantly false. Behind all this is the safe assumption that
morality should drive policy. |
The
Conventional Doctrine: CDE |
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1 |
Passive Euthanasia is morally
permissible. |
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2 |
Active Euthanasia is morally
impermissible. |
Statement of the AMA:
The intentional termination of the life
of one human being by another--mercy killing--is contrary to that for
which the medical profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the
American Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of
extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body when there is
irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of
the patient and/or his immediate family. The advice and judgement of the
physician should be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family.
Rachels argues in this paper that CDE is false. But when is CDE false?
- CDE is true iff passive euthanasia is
morally permissible and active euthanasia is morally impermissible.
- CDE is false if passive euthanasia is
morally impermissible and active euthanasia is morally permissible.
- CDE is false if passive euthanasia and
active euthanasia are both morally permissible.
- CDE is false if passive euthanasia and
active euthanasia are both morally impermissible.
Thus Rachels can show that CDE is false by showing that
- there are cases in which passive
euthanasia is morally impermissible and active euthanasia is morally
permissible,
- passive euthanasia is morally no better
than active euthanasia or, equivalently, active euthanasia is morally no
worse than passive euthanasia.
- CDE has implications which are false.
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Rachels Arguments Against CDE
Argument A |
1 |
If CDE is true then
passive euthanasia never produces more suffering than active
euthanasia. |
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2 |
It is not the case that
passive euthanasia never produces more suffering than active euthanasia. |
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Therefore |
3 |
CDE is not true. |
1&2 |
Note that if placed in the context of a
utilitarian theory, Argument A essentially argues that the CDE is false by
showing that there are cases in which passive euthanasia is morally
impermissible and active euthanasia is morally permissible,.
Argument B |
1 |
If acting in accordance
with CDE leads to decisions about passive euthanasia being made on
irrelevant grounds, then CDE is false. |
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2 |
Acting in accordance with
CDE leads to decisions about passive euthanasia being made on irrelevant
grounds. |
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Therefore |
3 |
CDE is false. |
1&2 |
Note that Argument B argues that the CDE is
false by showing that it has implications which are false.
Argument C |
1 |
If killing is morally
worse than letting die, then for any two cases C1 and C2, where C1 and
C2 are exactly alike in all respects except that in C1 there is a
killing while in C2 there is a letting die, C1 is morally worse than
C2. |
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2 |
It is not the case that for
any two cases C1 and C2, where C1 and C2 are exactly alike in all
respects except that in C1 there is a killing while in C2 there is a
letting die, C1 is morally worse than C2. |
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Therefore |
3 |
It is not the case that
killing is morally worse than letting die. |
1&2 |
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4 |
If CDE is true then killing
is morally worse than letting die. |
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Therefore |
5 |
CDE is not true. |
3&4 |
Note that Argument C argues that CDE is false by
showing that passive euthanasia is morally no better than active euthanasia
or, equivalently, that active euthanasia is morally no worse than passive
euthanasia.
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An unsound Argument against CDE
In order to clinch his case against CDE,
Rachels must show that arguments which might be presented in favor of CDE
are unsound in addition to giving arguments against CDE. Accordingly,
Rachels considers the following argument.
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1 |
Active
euthanasia is doing something to bring about death. |
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2 |
Passive
euthanasia is not doing anything. |
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3 |
Doing something
to bring about death is worse than not doing anything. |
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Therefore |
4 |
Active
euthanasia is worse than passive euthanasia. |
1,2&3 |
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5 |
If active
euthanasia is worse than passive euthanasia, then CDE is true. |
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Therefore |
6 |
CDE is true. |
4&5 |
Rachels' response: this argument is unsound!
- Premise 2 is false. Why?
- Premise 3 is false. Why?
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© Copyright Philip A. Pecorino 2002. All Rights
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