READING: John A. Robertson : The status of impaired infants Infants are persons and entitled to care. There is no way to evaluate and
measure the total costs and consequences and so there should be no
utilitarian justification for the withholding of treatment and care.
Outline by Don
Berkich, University of Texas, Corpus Christi
(by permission)
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Robertson criticizes
three arguments which might be put forward to show that severely
deformed infants do not have a right to ordinary but necessary medical
care. His strategy is that of defeating arguments against a severely
deformed infant's right to ordinary but necessary medical care so as to
argue for the presumptively true thesis that the vast majority of
severely deformed infants do have a right to ordinary but necessary
medical care.
To understand Robertson's strategy it is important
to understand the concept of the burden proof:
The concept of burden of proof is ordinarily a legal one. But it does
have application in philosophical discourse. Suppose I claim that the
moon is made of green cheese. Then, given everything else we know, it is
reasonable to say, "prove it". In other-words, I bear the burden of
proof. Since there is a presumption that what I have said is false, I
have to give an argument to show that the moon is made of green cheese.
Now suppose I give just such an argument. The presumption, again, is
that the moon is not made of green cheese. So I bear the burden of
proof. If my argument is sound, then I've satisfied my burden of proof.
But if you somehow show that my argument is unsound, then you've shown
that I've failed to bear the burden of proof and the presumption remains
that the moon isn't made of green cheese.
Now, with respect to Robertson's article the presumption is that
infants, even severely deformed infants, have a right to medical care.
So those who argue that they don't bear the burden of proof. In this
article Robertson is taking the role you did in showing that I failed to
bear the burden of proof for showing that the moon is made of green
cheese, except here Robertson is arguing that those who have argued that
not all infants have a right to medical care fail to bear the burden of
proof. If he is correct, then the presumption returns to all infants
having a right to medical care.
Robertson succeeds in showing the first two arguments he tackles
unsound, but his assertion that disutility can be minimized is
unconvincing--it's not at all clear that he's shown the third argument
unsound. |
Argument I |
1 |
Only persons have a right
to ordinary but necessary medical care. |
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2 |
No severely deformed infant
is a person. |
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Therefore |
3 |
No severely deformed infant
has a right to ordinary but necessary medical care. |
1&2 |
Let us be very clear: Robertson is not
putting this forward as an argument he thinks is sound. Just the opposite:
Robertson is putting forward this argument so as to show why it is unsound.
Robertson's strategy is to show that premise
(2) has unacceptable consequences and so ought to be rejected (for most
cases).
Robertson's criticism: Let R =
If x is conceived and born of human parents, then x is a person.
|
1 |
No severely deformed
infant is a person. |
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|
2 |
If no severely deformed
infant is a person, then R is false. |
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Therefore |
3 |
R is false. |
1&2 |
So here we have it that premise (2) of
Argument I implies that R is false. But why should that be a problem?
Because if history is any guide the idea that being born of human parents is
not enough to make one a person leads to astonishing abuses. Thus
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1 |
If allowing exceptions to
a rule is subject to significant abuse, then exceptions may not be
allowed to that rule unless they can be justified beyond reasonable
doubt. |
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2 |
Allowing exceptions to rule
R is subject to significant abuse. |
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Therefore |
3 |
Exceptions may not be
allowed to rule R unless they can be justified beyond reasonable doubt. |
1&2 |
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4 |
If exceptions may not be
allowed to rule R unless they can be justified beyond reasonable doubt,
then it is not the case that no severely deformed infant is a person. |
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Therefore |
5 |
It is not the case that no
severely deformed infant is a person. |
3&4 |
Since premise (2) is false, Argument I is
unsound. The question, however, is whether or not there are any exceptions
to rule R. Are there any exceptions which can be established beyond a
reasonable doubt? Robertson thinks so, but only very few:
- "Those suffering from malformations...
that do not affect mental capacities would not fit the class of nonpersons."
- "Frequently even the most severe cases of
mental retardation cannot be reliably determined until a much later
period."
- "The only group of defective newborns who
would clearly qualify as nonpersons is anencephalics, who altogether lack
a brain, or those so severely brain-damaged that it is immediately clear
that a sense of self can never develop."
Argument II:
The "Quality of Defective Infant's
Life" Argument. |
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1 |
Every person whose continued
living is in his or her own best interests has a right to ordinary but
necessary medical care. |
|
|
2 |
No severely deformed infant
is a person whose continued living is in its own best interests. |
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Therefore |
3 |
No severely deformed infant
has a right to ordinary but necessary medical care. |
1&2 |
Robertson's Criticisms:
- Clearly premise (2) is false: there are
many severely deformed infants whose continued living is in their own best
interests.
- And even if there are some cases, there
are very few such cases.
- Of course, the infant can't indicate its
preference, so we have the added difficulty of relying on a proxy's
judgement.
Argument III:
The "Suffering of Other's"
Argument. |
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1 |
x has a right to ordinary
but necessary medical care iff the medical care of x maximizes utility. |
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2 |
It is not the case that the
medical care of severely deformed infants maximizes utility. |
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Therefore |
3 |
It is not the case that
severely deformed infants have a right to ordinary but necessary medical
care. |
1&2 |
Robertson's Criticisms:
- A problem with premise (1) is that it is a
straightforward utilitarian principle. But how do we actually measure
utility? What about the rights argument?
- Also, it is clear that steps can be taken
to minimize disutility:
- Counselling can reduce disutility to the family.
- Management can reduce disutility to health professionals.
- Trade-offs in the health budget would be small if properly handled.
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